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The “Gemeinschaftsdiagnose” [Joint Diagnosis (JD)] is the most influential semi-annual mac-
roeconomic forecast in Germany. Jointly produced by up to six institutes, its accuracy as well 
as the large number of involved participants is often criticised. This study examines the JD’s 
growth and inflation forecasts from 1970 to 2007, including most of the contributions of the 
forecasts submitted by the five institutes at the start of the JD. Four questions are addressed: 
(i) Are these forecasts unbiased and efficient? (ii) How do results change if we presume an 
asymmetric loss function? (iii) Are any of the institutes more accurate than the JD? Are 
five/six institutes necessary and at what cost? (iv) Do the institutes make strategic forecasts to 
influence the JD forecast? Results show that there is no strong evidence of bias or inefficiency 
of the institutes’ forecasts and no evidence of asymmetric loss functions. Five institutes are 
not necessary, but it is very hard to predict the redundant institutes; however, the loss of accu-
racy by employing only two is small.  
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1.  Introduction 
Twice a year for nearly six decades approximately 50 affiliates of five, and later six major 
German
1 economic research institutes have convened to produce the “Gemeinschaftsdiag-
nose” [Joint diagnosis (JD)].  This attracts considerable attention not only from the federal 
government, who commission the report, but also from the business community, business 
associations, unions, and the media. While it is within the forecast community a kind of “Star 
of Bethlehem,” the JD is also under attack. Customers complain about the seemingly low ac-
curacy (Döpke & Fritsche, 2009) of the forecast and also its short life.  By presenting new 
forecasts of their own about four weeks after publication of the JD, the institutes degrade the 
results of their joint effort. The high cost of the report (almost 2 m €  in 2007) is also criti-
cised. Hence, it is argued that the size of this “cartel” should be reduced to one or two alter-
nating institutes. Notwithstanding this criticism, customers defend the present structure by 
emphasizing the advantages of this unique accumulation of wide-ranging expertise as well as 
the JD’s pluralistic policy view that in their eyes assures high forecasting accuracy. 
Surprisingly, the latter argument has rarely been tested. The few exceptions so far include 
Klapper (2004) and Heilemann & Quaas (2006), which addressed the way in which the insti-
tutes’ forecast proposals (see below) are combined. The present paper extends and broadens 
these studies by asking:  
–  How accurate are the institutes’ forecast proposals at the start of the JD and at the final 
JD? Do they pass usual tests of unbiasedness and efficiency? How does this relate to 
the JD?  
–  Do all institutes contribute to the JD forecast and to its accuracy in an equal way? Do 
these contributions change over time and in which ways? 
–  Is there a role for strategic behaviour, personal elements, and reputation gains in joint 
production of a forecast like the JD? 
–  Would a smaller number of institutes be sufficient – or even better – and what would 
be its price in terms of accuracy gains or losses? 
 
In short: Do too many cooks spoil the broth? 
 
To answer these questions is more difficult than it may appear at first sight. Leaving different 
theories or models aside, differences in accuracy may be due to different assumptions and to 
                                                 
1 As described in the next section, since spring 2007 things have changed somewhat.  
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differences in the data employed,
2 and hence, may not tell much about the capabilities of the 
forecaster. The importance of the assumptions, such as world trade, import prices, interest 
rates, government construction outlays, etc., is difficult for third parties to assess since they 
are not listed in the proposals. However, judging from the institute’s official forecasts, these 
differences tend to be rather small, and their short run influences are limited; they should not 
count for much of the differences. Also for similar reasons the second argument can be dis-
missed. The institutes must submit their forecast at least four days before the start of the JD, 
and it can be safely assumed that all institutes share the same information and process it in a 
similar way. As with any comparison of the following type, the result does not permit state-
ments about the quality of the hypotheses or the model employed. 
 
The study had to be restricted in several ways. Firstly, we examine only the forecasts of 
growth and inflation as the most interesting and most fundamental variables. While both fore-
casts are in a material sense not independent of each other, we analyse them – as nearly all 
studies do – as separate forecasts. Secondly, we examine only the autumn forecasts with a 
forecast horizon of 1 ½ years. With respect to policy, these results should be more important 
than the spring forecasts for the current year. The sample period covers the forecasts for 1970 
to 2007, the years 1969 to 2006. Finally, we assume that the production of the JD is not dis-
turbed by new information that would make the institute’s proposals obsolete, and if there 
were such information, it would not change their relative positions.  
 
The next section (2) briefly describes the JD’s main institutional and procedural details. Sec-
tion 3 presents the data. In Section 4, we first examine the accuracy of the forecast proposals 
and compare them with that of the JD; second, we look for each institute’s contribution to the 
accuracy of the joint forecast; third, we search for strategic and personal influences. The final 
section (5) summarizes the findings of this paper and offers some conclusions.  
 
2 The "Joint Diagnosis" 
From 1950 to 2007 five members (six since 1993) of the “Arbeitsgemeinschaft Deutscher 
Wirtschaftswissenschaftlicher Forschungsinstitute” jointly produce and publish, usually in 
April and in October, a detailed macroeconomic forecast for Germany (Antholz, 2006). The 
institutes involved include: 
                                                 
2   The institute’s data differences usually occur with respect to the current quarter. They tend to disappear when 
during the JD indicator results become available.   
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–  The Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW), Berlin; 
–  The Hamburgisches Welt-Wirtschafts-Archiv, (HWWA) after 2007: Hamburgisches 
Welt-Wirtschafts-Institut (HWWI), Hamburg (from 1953 to 2006); 
–  The Ifo-Institut, Munich; 
–  The Institut für Weltwirtschaft (IfW) Kiel (since 1970 as a full member); 
–  The Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (IWH), Halle (since 1993); 
–  The Institut für Landwirtschaftliche Marktforschung (ILM), Braunschweig (until 
1970), and 
–  The Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (RWI), Essen. 
The work was based on an annually prolonged contract with the federal government, and for 
most of that time the contract was with the Federal Ministry of Economics. In 2007 the cus-
tomer changed the rules somewhat with the result being that among others, the JD is now 
produced by three consortia lead by Ifo, IWH, and RWI, which all entailed at least one other 
institute, not necessarily a German one, and by IfW. Furthermore, the procedure involves 
regular evaluation procedures and the contract will not be prolonged in a “quasi-automatic” 
way. This should lead to a somewhat higher level of competition in the future.
3 
 
A central part of the contract is a numerical macroeconomic forecast for Germany. Since 1969 
this forecast has to be presented in quantitative terms within the NA framework (levels, rates 
of change against previous year) with a horizon of up to two years (spring) or 1 ½ year (au-
tumn). While the forecasts are based on quarterly data, the presentation of the forecasts report 
only semi-annual and annual results.  
 
Approximately six weeks before the proper beginning of the JD, a kick-off meeting of the 
persons leading the institutes’ teams (“Federführende”) and the heads of the international 
groups is held. In a subsequent meeting the customer specifies special questions he wants to 
see assessed in the report. Two weeks later, a consultative meeting with experts from the 
Deutsche Bundesbank, the European Central Bank, and from the federal ministry in charge 
takes place. After this, the JD starts with about 50 members from the participating institutes; 
the meeting continues for up to ten days and is held at one of the institutes. As previously 
mentioned, four days before the proper start, each institute is required to submit its detailed 
forecast. These estimates are summarized and averaged in a “synopsis” made available to all 
participants. These estimates may differ from the institutes’ actual official forecast, but the 
                                                 
3   Since the rules are quite new, it is too early to evaluate if the level of competition did increase.  
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institutes are prohibited, now in their contracts, to publish new forecasts four weeks before 
and after the JD publication. 
 
The production of the JD is organized in a number of working groups, each analysing and 
forecasting one or more major macroeconomic aggregates (Stäglin, 1998). The forecasts are 
based on a set of assumptions agreed upon by the “Federführenden” and the members of the 
international and monetary policy group in the kick-off meeting. These assumptions typically 
refer to oil price developments, interest and exchange rates, and wage developments. After 
merging all individual forecasts and completing a detailed calculation and discussion process, 
the various groups report their forecasts to the “Federführenden.” The production of the fore-
cast is structured according to the informal GDP model. The methods employed range from 
exogenous settings to econometric equations and macroeconometric models to check the 
overall results. The “Federführenden” put the group results in a national account framework, 
and then discuss the results among themselves and with the various groups. They usually de-
mand revisions of the forecasts, recheck the new overall forecast for consistency, etc. The 
forecast is usually completed after two or three such rounds. The final forecast is discussed in 
a plenum session. The iteration steps, though a natural part of the informal GDP model, also 
reflect problems of coordinating different views in or between groups or between groups and 
the “Federführenden.” More substantial reasons may be unwelcome policy implications of a 
forecast or a significant contrast from an institute’s own views. Of course, theory has its place 
in this process as well as new events, policies, new information from indicators, data revisions 
etc. So far, there is not much evidence that changes of the exogenous environment played a 
major role in this process, as may be deduced also from Table 1 below. Of course, the final 
forecast is not always just the result of an exclusively evidence-based discourse.  
 
After about ten days, a final draft of the completed 60+ page report is discussed by the “Fed-
erführenden” and their deputies. If one or two institutes still find that they do not subscribe to 
the forecast (or a particular view expressed in the report), they have the opportunity to express 
the points of dissent (not necessarily a complete forecast) in a minority vote. Not surprisingly, 
there is much bargaining between the “Federführenden” to avoid such a situation because 
minority votes are seen as diminishing the JD’s impact. The final report is transmitted to the 




At the start of the next JD, the “Federführenden” discuss, with different and varying passion, 
the last report and its forecast. Recently, the spring JD has a page or two analysing the accu-
racy of the previous spring forecast, but rarely goes beyond a simple forecast/actual compari-
son. There is no evidence that the institutes’ forecast submissions also undergo a common 
post mortem analysis. One reason may be that with a multivariate, multi-period forecast not 
much can be learned from such an analysis. For the same reason it is difficult to pick a winner 
in a convincing way, and, as with all comparisons of forecast accuracy, it would be difficult 
for the group tied together by contract to draw any conclusions. Furthermore, for data reasons, 
the autumn forecast for the coming year can be properly evaluated only after about 18 
months. Additionally, given the great amount of theories, assumptions, methods, and data 
employed by the institutes, higher accuracy is primarily seen as documenting good luck rather 
than greater skills. Finally and more generally, past success does not tell much about future 
accomplishments. 
3 Data 
The analysis concentrates on the annual forecast for the autumn year ahead including real 
GDP growth (rates of change against previous year) and inflation (deflator of private con-
sumption, rates of change against previous year) submitted by DIW, HWWA/HWWI, Ifo, 
IfW, and RWI as parts of their NA forecasts; the IWH is not included because it joined the JD 
only in 1993. Actual data are the first-published official NA data as shown in the JD’s spring 
forecast following the year covered by the forecast. The sample starts with the autumn fore-
casts for 1970 and ends with the forecasts for 2007. For some details, see Table A1a, b in the 
Appendix. 
 
The submissions are not official forecasts and to protect their privacy we coded them as A 
through E. All data are available from the authors upon request; the decoding is available only 
to the institutes.  
 
As to notation:  1 ˆ − t t y  is the forecast of a variable for the year t  with the information in  1 − t . 






4.1 Accuracy, unbiasedness, efficiency: defining benchmarks 
 
To get a first impression, we calculated the usual error statistics for the two variables. As Ta-
ble 1 reveals, the errors are uncomfortably large but differ not much neither from German nor 
from international macroeconomic forecasting standards (Heilemann & Stekler, 2003). The 
differences between the institutes’ forecasts as well as between them and the JD are rather 
small. As expected, the picture is more varied for sub-periods. The decennium horribele, the 
1970s, witnesses not only considerable increases of the error statistics in general but also a 
tripling of the bias of growth forecasts. During the 1980s, accuracy increases and variance 
between the forecasters gets smaller. The 1990s see a further reduction of errors but a widen-
ing of the range of growth forecasts. The most recent period, because of its short length not 
quite comparable to the other results, experienced a new deterioration of the accuracy of the 
growth forecasts, while that of the inflation forecasts further improved. 
 
The range of the institutes’ proposals (minimum/maximum), the JD, and the actual develop-
ment are confronted in Figure A 1a, b in the Appendix. Three features seem to be remarkable: 
First, the dispersion of the set of forecasts, at least in absolute terms, is generally declining, 
and most pronounced for inflation. The underlying factors might be the post-oil shocks better 
understanding of inflationary processes and a stability-oriented monetary system (Heilemann 
& Stekler, 2003). Second, the JD forecasts, with few exceptions, nest within the range of the 
proposals, suggesting that formally, the JD forecast is a weighted average of the proposals 
(Heilemann & Quaas, 2006). However, it is plausible that the weights were not constant over 
time and evolved according to the power and pervasiveness of different institution’s argu-
ments. Third, in most cases, the cross section distribution of all proposals misses the actual 
distribution. Even if the cross-section dispersion is sometimes referred to as an indicator of 
forecast uncertainty (Linden, 2003), this finding shows that the cross-section distribution is 
not a very simple proxy for the overall forecast uncertainty of the JD, a result that is in line 
with the findings of Bomberger (1996) and Rich & Tracey (2003).  
 




In addition to being of the highest accuracy, it is usually agreed that “rational” and non-
intentional forecasts should be unbiased and should fulfil certain criteria of efficiency. In the 
present case, things may be more complicated. The proposals are not published and for a 
number of reasons the institutes may employ them to manoeuvre the JD forecast and the re-
sulting policy advice in a particular direction. Such intentions cannot be ruled out, and, in-
deed, there is some anecdotic evidence for this, but as Table 1 reveals, the leeway for this is 
very small. Notwithstanding, we examine in detail whether forecasts are unbiased and effi-
cient. We made use of a number of non-parametric tests which are summarized in Table 2:
4 
–  As a test for bias, we applied the test of Dufour (1981) as used by Campbell & Ghy-
sels, (1995) which has the advantage of avoiding restrictive assumptions on well-
behaved residuals as in the case of most of the regression-based tests. Suppose that we 
compute the absolute value of the difference between each observation and the mean, 
and then rank these observations from high to low. Then the test is based on the idea 
that the sum of the ranks for the samples above and below the median should be simi-
lar. This is a signed rank test with the null hypothesis 0 ) ˆ ( : 1 0 = − t t e median H . Accord-
ing to Campbell & Ghysels (1995), this test is preferable to parametric tests for small 
samples.  
–  As a test for efficiency, we again used a test proposed by Campbell and Ghysels 
(1995) to test for absence of serial correlation in the forecasts errors, i. e. that the me-
dian of the product of two consecutive forecast errors is centred on a median of zero, 
i.e.  0 ) ˆ ˆ ( : 2 1 1 0 = ∗ − − − t t t t e e median H .  
  
Overall, we have mixed evidence for deviations from unbiasedness or efficiency. On the one 
hand, the numbers in Table 1 showed quite remarkable error margins and point to at least a 
somewhat biased forecast of some institutions in certain periods. On the other hand, the non-
parametric test procedure applied here (Table 2) does not point to significant anomalies given 
the few observations we have.
5 
 
About here Table 2 
 
                                                 
4    For both tests, EViews reports a p-value for the asymptotic normal approximation to the Wilcoxon T-
statistic. We performed the usual parametric tests as well; the results are available on request. One might argue 
that all these tests are of limited value since the forecasts are scientific forecasts, i.e. based on assumptions and 
are meaningful only if controlled for assumptions. This is of course true as Keereman (2003) has shown. How-
ever, due to limitations in our data set, we have to shift the analysis of this feature into the future. 
5   The results from parametric tests – using Newey-West standard errors – did also not show any evidence for 
bias or inefficiency.  
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Summing up the results from Table 2, the inflation forecasts show some signs of inefficiency 
in the 1970s and 1980s. As a consequence of the two oil crises and their aftermath, errors of 
inflation forecasts were large and serially correlated (Döpke & Fritsche, 2006a, Heilemann & 
Stekler, 2003). This problem diminished in the late 1980s and 1990s. All in all, there is evi-
dence that inflation rate forecasts have to be seen as not very efficient during the early part of 
the sample – a problem which is obviously much less so at the present time.  Given the results 
in the literature – namely Heilemann & Stekler (2003) – this is not astonishing. 
 
4.2 Relative forecast performance: individual dimension 
 
After we gathered information about the average accuracy of the institutes’ proposals, we 
asked more precisely whether any of the institutions – according to the certain criteria ex-
plained below – "outperform" the JD, i.e. is significantly better in some features than the JD.  
From the huge battery of tests available and proposed in the literature (e.g., Diebold & 
Mariano, 1995), we decided to present only a few tests to make the point. First, we applied a 
standard test, namely the well-known Diebold-Mariano (1995) test with the null hypothesis of 
an average equality of expected forecast accuracy over the sample against the alternative of 
different forecast accuracies. We report the p-values for the (one-sided) test that the respective 
institution performs "better" than the JD forecast for the variable under investigation and vice 
versa (i.e. the JD outperforms the individual forecast). The test is reliable in larger samples 
only; therefore, only full sample results are reported (Table 3). 
 
About here Table 3 
 
The standard procedure shows evidence that some growth forecasts (B and D) differ signifi-
cantly from the JD. In two out of five cases, the null of equal forecast accuracy is rejected at a 
5 percent level; in four out of five cases, on a 10 percent level. The results, however, also in-
dicate that the JD on an average outperforms the individual forecasts – a result in line with 
much of the forecast combination literature (Clemen, 1989; Makridakis & Hibon, 2000; 
Marcellino, 2004; Elliott & Timmermann, 2008). 
 
Relative forecast performance on an average is, however, only part of the story. As Campbell 
& Murphy (2006) argue, the coverage rate of the individual forecasts taken together as a 
group before entering the merging procedure might be somewhat poor. Following Campbell 
& Murphy (2006) and based on the early work of Milton Friedman (1937, 1940), we apply  
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another class of tests, not often used for forecast evaluation. These tests are based on the idea 
that the performance of each forecaster can at any point in time be ranked (in contrast to a 
ranking over the whole sample). If the group is homogenous, the forecasts cannot be distin-
guished; any forecaster has the same probability of achieving the same rank as any other. The 
average of the forecaster's rank should, therefore, not deviate from the mid-rank.  Campbell & 
Murphy (2006) propose applying the tests to the "accuracy" and "style" of forecasts. Ranking 
by accuracy is understood as being based on the squared error (therefore independent if there 
is an over- or underestimation), by “style” as ranking by the size of the forecast (therefore 
aiming at detecting for some statistically significant differences in systematic over- or under-
estimation). (Table 4)  
 
About here Table 4 
 
When applying this test, one has to keep in mind that differences in the ranks must be pro-
nounced to produce significant results in very small samples.
 6 Nevertheless, even then there 
is some evidence that the growth forecasts in the 1990s differed significantly regarding their 
tendency to over- and underestimate. This is in line with the results of Antholz (2005) who 
showed that in this period the number of minority votes was the highest ever observed.  
 
4.3 Relative forecast performance: JD versus a smaller group of forecasters 
 
Since the differences between forecasters are so small, critics of the JD often question the 
usefulness of having a group of five/six institutes, as mentioned above. To examine this issue, 
we calculate the mean of the five proposals and compare the results with the JD outcome and 
the realizations (Table A.1 a, b in the Appendix). 
 
The results again confirm Heilemann & Quaas (2006). The widespread perception by fore-
casters and the media is that the JD outcome can be pretty well guessed by averaging the pro-
posals. In other words, looking only at JD’s forecasting performance, the rewards of the joint 
efforts are very small. 
 
In addition, we ranked, first, the institutes according to their performance over a certain dec-
ade (criteria: root mean squared error, RMSE); second, we selected the two best performing 
                                                 
6   Comparing these results with those of Campbell / Murphy (2006) for Canada reveals that here, the dif-
ferences are in general much less pronounced. One has to keep in mind, however, that the authors had a more 
detailed data set (demand components).  
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as well as the two worst performing institutes over the decade and calculated synthetic JD 
results by simply averaging the forecasts of the respective two institutions for the decade fol-
lowing the decade where the choice was made. In doing so, we assume a situation where all 
institutes’ forecasts are evaluated in a way to serve as a base for a JD contract for the coming 
decade. Third, we compare the RMSE’s of this synthetic JD’s with the RMSE of the real JD 
(Table 5). 
 
About here Table 5 
 
The results can be interpreted in two ways. First, in most cases, the JD result slightly outper-
forms the synthetic JD’s; however, the differences are very small. This is not astonishing as 
the results from the forecasting combination literature – a weighted average of a greater num-
ber of informative forecasts often outperforms an average based on a smaller number of fore-
casts – is confirmed. Much more astonishing here is that it makes no difference if we pick the 
best or the worst performers.  
 
4.4 Relative forecast performance: cross-section information 
 
It may be objected to that the synthetic JD is the result of a simple averaging of two forecasts 
while the actual JD is a joint product of five or six institutes. Table 5 gave no hint that this 
combination results in sizeable accuracy gains. Nevertheless, the question as to whether the 
submission of five or six forecasts to the JD forecast contains information not already covered 
by the average of the forecasts of some randomly selected institutes deserves a closer exami-
nation. We, therefore, had a look at the cross-section distribution of the forecasts. As indi-
cated above, the cross-section distribution of forecast errors cannot serve as a very simple 
measure for individual forecast uncertainty due to theoretical reasons (Bomberger, 1996, Rich 
& Tracey, 2003); however, the range of the submissions might contain some information 
about the size of JD’s future errors. The range between minimum and maximum may be seen 
as such an indicator or the size of the forecast errors to be expected – at least for the most 
prominent figure, the GDP/GNP growth rate.
7 The relationship is shown in Figure 1. 
 
About here Figure 1 
                                                 
7   The finding is confirmed by two simple regressions. In case of GDP/GNP growth, we receive 
18 . 0 , 56 . 0 48 . 0
2
) 11 . 3 ( ) 18 . 2 ( = + = R Range e t t . In the case of inflation, we receive  02 . 0 , 24 . 0 57 . 0
2
) 00 . 1 ( ) 16 . 3 ( = + = R Range e t t  (t-




The scatter plot suggests a positive relationship between the range of submissions and the 
JD’s absolute forecast errors – at least for growth forecast errors. This is in line with previous 
findings for Germany (cf. Döpke & Fritsche 2006b) and many others countries (Dovern et al., 
2009) which find an increasing disagreement across forecasters during times signalling up-
coming recessions.
8 As a result, by publishing the institutes’ proposals, the informational con-
tent of the JD could be increased. While the cost for doing this would be small, it might re-
duce the institutes’ propensity to compromise and the JD’s image of coherence might suffer. 
Similar conflicts arise with the selection of participating institutes and here the new arrange-
ment of the JD has opted for a broader pool from which to choose contractors.  
 
4.5 Strategic behaviour and changing influences 
 
Since the JD in a sense competes with the participating institutes’ (analysis) and forecasts, 
strategic behaviour at the JD for both institutional and personal reasons, cannot be excluded. 
Of particular interest is the question as to whether the forecasters’ loss functions are symmet-
ric, and, if they are not, this could mean that the proposals are intentional.  
 
Indeed, some forecasters of the JD group have long since been assigned to the "Keynesian" or 
"Monetarist" camp (Döpke 2000). If this would hold also for their proposals, we would expect 
a tendency to underestimate growth and overestimate inflation. Therefore, we first test for the 
existence of asymmetric loss functions
9. The above tests for bias and rationality implicitly 
assumed that forecasters have a symmetric loss function. However, this is not necessarily the 
case. There are many reasons why forecasters might try to avoid errors on the side of the dis-
tribution, in particular because of  the personal cost in terms of reputation.  
 
Second, we test for the existence of changing "dominance" in the JD. Given the JD practice of 
forecasting, it is obvious that not just theory, data and methods but also "men" play quite a 
role in the process of forecast production. Since we were not able to track the changes in the 
                                                 
8   However, this result considers only the alpha error – neglecting the fact that a high range might give a 
wrong signal and does not indicate a future recession. In 2004, the range was high but did not signal a recession. 
This could indicate that a high range might be closer linked to turning points in general but not to slips into re-
cessions alone. It may be added that in the period under study the autumn forecasts of the JD did never forecast a 
recession.  
9   Under present circumstances, with at least three parties involved – the customer, the JD, and the various 
institutes – the concept of loss function appears as very opaque. Each party might have its own trade-offs and be 
of different and varying influence.   
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personal structure of the JD and of the “Federführenden,” we test for changes in the weights 
of the institutes over time in the JD exercise of "forecast combination.” Despite being well 
aware that such shifts may be attributable to a host of other factors, experience within the JD 
and outside suggest that these weights might well be seen as a function of “charisma” and 
“persuasive power.” 
 
4.4.1 Is there evidence for an asymmetric loss function? 
 
A large body of literature has investigated the issue of accuracy, bias, and especially the vari-
ous concepts of rationality and concluded that the full rationality of business cycle forecasts 
has to be rejected. (e.g. Döpke & Fritsche, 2006; Heilemann & Stekler, 2003, Kirchgässner & 
Savioz, 2001 Fildes & Stekler, 2002).  
 
Batchelor & Peel (1998), Elliott et al. (2005) and Patton & Timmerman (2006) disputed this 
and argue that the observed forecast errors might well be in line with rational expectations, as 
long as the loss function of the respective forecasters is not symmetric, as it is assumed in the 
usual tests of the rationality hypothesis. Such an asymmetric loss function might also be quite 
relevant in "games" like the JD where intentional behaviour is not unlikely.  
 
To test for asymmetries, we refer to the approach of Elliot et al., (2005) which starts from the 
general loss function: 
 
(1)  [ ]
p
t t t t y y y y p L 1 1 1 1 ˆ ) 0 ˆ ( ) 2 1 ( ) , , ( + + + + − < − ⋅ − + = Θ I α α α  
 
In this type of loss function, the parameter  p  represents the underlying general assumption 
about the shape of the function. In particular,  1 = p  stands for a linear-linear (lin-lin) loss 
function, while in the case of  2 = p  the calculations are based on a quadratic-quadratic (quad-
quad) loss function. Furthermore, the loss function consists of a symmetry parameterα . It 
represents the degree of symmetry or asymmetry of the loss function. In particular, a value of 
5 . 0 = α yields a symmetric loss function, while  5 . 0 > α  represents the case of forecasters' 
incentives to issue optimistic forecasts. Finally, any value  5 . 0 < α  stands for cases of too-
pessimistic forecasts. Using different parameters, we can test for a great number of loss func-
tions. For example  ) ˆ ( ) ,
2
1
, 1 ( 1 1 + + − = Θ t t y y L  yields a symmetric quadratic loss function (Elliot  
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et al. 2005). The approach also to determine criteria of forecast optimality, which, in turn, can 
be interpreted as the moment condition(s) for an instrument variable estimator (here: GMM). 
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with S ˆ  as a weighting matrix. Since S ˆ  in turn depends on α ˆ , the estimation has to be per-
formed iteratively, assuming  I = S ˆ  in the first round and using a vector  t υ  of instrument(s). 
Hence, the estimation is based on the considerations of Hansen (1982).
10 Elliot et al. (2005) 
show that the estimator of  T α is asymptotically normal and renders it possible to test for the 
hypothesis  5 . 0 = α  i.e. for loss function symmetry.  
 
For the procedure to work appropriately, instruments are needed. Following Elliot et al. 
(2005), the instruments considered here are: i) a constant; ii) a constant and a lagged forecast 
error; iii) a constant and the lagged variable to be predicted (i.e. the growth and inflation rate, 
respectively); and iv) a constant, the lagged forecast error, and the lagged variable to be pre-
dicted. The estimation results for the data set under investigation are given in Table 6 and 
summarized in Figures 2 and 3. 
 
About here Table 6, Figures 2 and 3 
 
                                                 
10   See furthermore Hansen and West (2002) for a survey and a discussion of the relation of IV (GMM) 
estimation to macroeconomic applications.  
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In summary:  
–  First, the null of a symmetric loss function is almost never rejected if we look at the 
full sample. This holds for growth as well as inflation forecasts of all institutes and of 
the JD.  
–  Second, for the growth forecasts and by splitting the sample around the middle, we 
find that on an average they were slightly over-pessimistic in the first half of the sam-
ple and slightly over-optimistic in the second half of the sample, which confirms the 
results from the bias results. Using the J-test we can test for the significance of the 
bias. There is only one institute, where we find a significant deviation from symmetry 
in the loss function, Institute C in the second half of the sample. In all other cases, the 
deviations can be regarded as being too small to give an indication of asymmetric loss 
functions.  
–  In the case of inflation forecasts, we find a slight tendency of over-pessimism, irre-
spective of the assumed sample. In the second half of the sample this tendency became 
somewhat more pronounced, but is still far from being significant for any of the fore-
casters (again Institute C being the exception). 
 
In general, the case for any asymmetric loss function must therefore be seen as extremely 
weak. From that perspective, there is no indication for intentional forecasts. In contrast, in 
almost all cases, the forecasts are symmetric and not biased. Periods of over-optimism or pes-
simism seem to be relevant for the whole bulk of forecasters but not related with the “posi-




4.4.2 Changing “dominance” over time 
 
To assess the “dominance” problem, the influence of institutes on the JD and its change over 
time, we analyzed the stability of the institutes’ weights in explaining the JD results by "fore-
cast combination" regressions. More specifically, we regressed the JD forecast on the propos-
als of all institutes and restricted the sum of the coefficients to be one (Bates & Granger, 
1969, Granger & Ramanathan, 1984) that is  t
E
A i
it i t X JD ε β + =∑
=
 with  it X  being the individual 
                                                 
11   It may be argued that the institutes’ theoretical positions are more closely reflected in the policy rec-
ommendations of the reports. This is confirmed by the fact that most of the “minority votes” address policy 
questions, depending on the degree in which the institutes had subscribed to Keynesian or Monetarist positions. 
A similar “bias” with respect to the institutes’ forecast submissions, however, is hard to detect.   
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"proposals" and estimated under the restrictions, that all weights have to be positive and sum 
up to 1. To apply the restriction we used an exponential transformation and then applied non-
linear least squares for estimation. For a better presentation, we multiplied the coefficients by 
the factor 100. Figure 4, Panels a and b, illustrate that for some periods some institutions seem 
to have been particularly influential. This influence also changed strongly.  
 
About here Figure 4 
 
Institute A, for example, was quite influential during the 1970s and 1980s, and for inflation 
also in the 1990s. After that time, other institutes took over this position. Institute D, for in-
stance, had a minor influence in the 1980s but gained considerable influence in the 1990s, 
while Institute E seems to have dominated the new millennium so far. To which degree this 
reflects competence or factors like “charisma” or personal influence remains unclear, at least 
to third parties. However, we were not able to detect a clear pattern between forecast accuracy 
in the different decades (Table 1) and the forecast combination results. 
 
However, with the possibility of “minority votes” the JD offers the institutes additional possi-
bilities to let their voices be heard. The institutions use this option quite differently: only two 
of them made wide use of it, one in the 1980s and the other one in the 1990s; the others 
hardly used it at all. Of course, those institutes that entered the room with an “outsider” posi-
tion and opted for a minority vote could not be detected as being particular influential in the 
result. Nevertheless, this does not mean that those institutes did not influence; nor should they 
be considered as bad forecasters by their client or by the public. 
 
5. Summary and conclusions 
 
This paper analysed a number of questions arising from the results of the “Joint Diagnosis” 
(JD), the most influential semi-annual macroeconomic forecast for Germany. While the fore-
cast accuracy of the JD has often been studied, this is not the case with the forecast proposals 
of the participating institutes. Those forecast proposals have been employed to shed some 
light on the production process of this forecast. The analysis was restricted to the autumn 
forecasts of growth and inflation which have a forecast horizon of about 18 months. The pe-




Accuracy and bias of the institutes’ proposals for the two variables differ very little and the 
differences of the corresponding mean value with the JD are rarely larger than 0.5 percentage 
points. From a policy perspective, the accuracy of the growth forecasts is unsatisfactory low, 
but this is consistent with previous national and international findings. This is also true for the 
stability of the results: improvements of accuracy are mainly to be recorded for inflation fore-
casts. In general, the proposals passed the usual tests of unbiasedness and efficiency, but of 
course, this does not compensate for the disappointing low accuracy of the forecasts. 
 
Since the JD forecasts compete with the institute’s own forecasts, they could be expected to 
make strategic proposals to influence the outcome of the joint product, i.e. to have asymmet-
ric loss functions. However, related tests failed; all five institutes seem to share standard loss 
functions. Of course, the institutes’ hierarchy with respect to forecast accuracy changed over 
time and in some periods, and on an average some outperformed others and the JD. We found 
some evidence as to the dominance of some institutes and strategic behaviour, though this 
influence seems to have been weak.  
 
Status, persuasive power, and bargaining power seemed to be disproportionally distributed 
among the group. This raises doubts as to the necessity of having such a large group of insti-
tutes involved in such a resource-intensive process. However, the selection of a set of fore-
casters based on past records did not warrant a better performance. In practice, however, with 
annual forecasts this is difficult to do, despite the fact that here, as in general, past forecasting 
success is no guarantee for future success. Therefore, it may be somewhat comforting that 
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Table 1: Forecasts of growth and inflation, accuracy
1 of the Institutes’ propos-
als and of the JD, 1970 to 2007 
 
   1970-2007 
   JD  A  B  C  D  E 
GDP Bias  -0.20  -0.10 -0.30 -0.40 -0.30 -0.30 
 MAE  1.30  1.30 1.20 1.20 1.20 1.30 
 RMSE  1.80  1.70 1.70 1.60 1.70 1.80 
 RMSPE  292.00  301.00 373.00 347.00 369.00 330.00 
 RMSPE/M  88.40  86.20 83.90 80.60 85.30 93.20 
 Theils  U 0.80  0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 
Inflation Bias  0.00  0.10 0.10 0.10 0.00 -0.10 
 MAE  0.70  0.70 0.80 0.80 0.70 0.70 
 RMSE  0.90  0.90 1.00 1.00 0.90 1.00 
 RMSPE  109.00  115.00 113.00 106.00 96.10 99.80 
 RMSPE/M  31.50  31.70 33.50 34.90 30.80 31.70 
 Theils  U 0.80  1.00 0.80 0.90 1.00 0.80 
   1970-1979 
GDP Bias  -0.30  -0.70 -0.50 -0.60 -0.90 -0.50 
 MAE  2.30  2.10 2.00 1.60 2.00 2.20 
 RMSE  2.80  2.70 2.50 2.10 2.70 2.90 
 RMSPE  213.00  280.00 255.00 148.00 280.00 287.00 
 RMSPE/M  143.00  134.00 127.00 108.00 134.00 146.00 
 Theils  U 1.40  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Inflation Bias  0.40  0.50 0.60 0.70 0.20 0.40 
 MAE  1.20  1.10 1.30 1.40 1.10 1.10 
 RMSE  1.30  1.20 1.40 1.50 1.20 1.30 
 RMSPE  30.80  28.80 33.60 32.40 29.70 32.10 
 RMSPE/M  42.90  40.60 47.80 50.60 41.00 42.40 
 Theils  U 1.00  1.00 1.10 1.10 0.90 1.10 
   1980-1989 
GDP Bias  0.10  0.30 0.20 0.20 0.40 -0.10 
 MAE  1.00  1.00 1.00 1.20 0.90 1.10 
 RMSE  1.20  0.50 1.20 1.40 1.10 1.30 
 RMSPE  82.80  70.50 74.50 127.00 82.00 125.00 
 RMSPE/M  60.30  25.20 63.00 68.60 56.20 65.90 




Table 1: cont’d 
 
   1980-1989 
Inflation Bias  -0.10  -0.10 -0.10 -0.10 0.00 -0.10 
 MAE  1.00  1.00 1.00 1.10 1.00 1.00 
 RMSE  1.10  1.00 1.10 1.20 0.90 1.20 
 RMSPE  205.00  216.00 212.00 198.00 179.00 182.00 
 RMSPE/M  36.70  33.30 36.70 40.00 30.00 40.00 
 Theils  U 0.80  1.00 0.80 0.90 1.10 0.80 
   1990-1999 
GDP Bias  -0.40  0.10 -0.40 -0.70 -0.40 -0.50 
 MAE  0.80  0.90 0.90 1.00 0.70 0.90 
 RMSE  1.00  1.20 1.20 1.30 1.00 1.20 
 RMSPE  55.70  58.00 61.10 74.70 57.80 66.60 
 RMSPE/M  51.80  61.60 58.20 68.00 52.70 61.80 
 Theils  U 0.60  0.60 0.60 0.80 0.60 0.70 
Inflation Bias  -0.30  -0.30 -0.30 -0.30 -0.30 -0.40 
 MAE  0.40  0.40 0.40 0.40 0.50 0.50 
 RMSE  0.50  0.50 0.50 0.40 0.50 0.60 
 RMSPE  44.00  42.50 48.00 42.90 44.30 49.70 
 RMSPE/M  16.30  17.40 16.30 14.90 18.20 19.90 
 Theils  U 1.00  0.90 1.10 0.90 1.10 1.20 
   2000-2007 
GDP Bias  -0.30  -0.30 -0.40 -0.60 -0.30 -0.30 
 MAE  1.00  1.00 1.10 1.10 1.20 1.10 
 RMSE  1.20  1.20 1.20 1.30 1.40 1.30 
 RMSPE  579.00  567.00 753.00 719.00 733.00 624.00 
 RMSPE/M  59.80  59.20 62.80 67.70 69.30 65.30 
 Theils  U 0.43  0.43 0.570 0.53 0.55 0.47 
Inflation Bias  -0.10  0.20 0.00 0.00 0.10 -0.10 
 MAE  0.20  0.40 0.30 0.30 0.20 0.20 
 RMSE  0.30  0.50 0.30 0.30 0.20 0.30 
 RMSPE  24.40  37.40 20.50 26.20 16.00 21.40 
 RMSPE/M  9.30  17.60 9.10 11.20 7.60 8.30 
 Theils  U 0.52  0.96 0.50 0.67 0.52 0.50 
 
Authors’ computations. Data from the five institutes participating at the Joint Diagnosis, the 
Joint Diagnosis and the Federal Statistical Office. – 
1 Errors: actual ./. forecast. – MAE: Mean 
absolute error; RMSE: Root mean square error; RMSPE: Root mean square percentage error; 
RMSPE/M: Root mean square percentage error/Mean; Bias: Sum of absolute errors; Theils U: 





Table 2: Bias and Efficiency Tests of the Institutes’ proposals 






A B C D E JD 
Growth Bias    0.919  0.759 0.507 0.444 0.409 0.553 
   Efficiency   0.343  0.236 0.553 0.477 0.529 0.369 
Inflation Bias    0.667  0.788 0.988 0.689 0.446 0.706 
   Efficiency   0.011  0.016 0.077 0.035 0.019 0.018 
 1970-1979 
Growth Bias    0.407  0.554 0.919 0.760 0.507 0.444 
   Efficiency   0.529  0.363 0.343 0.236 0.636 0.477 
Inflation Bias    0.407  0.308 0.202 0.185 0.221 0.721 
   Efficiency   0.107  0.044 0.044 0.058 0.236 0.044 
   1980-1989 
Growth Bias    0.541  0.683 0.838 0.192 0.918 0.838 
   Efficiency   0.838  0.919 0.610 0.441 0.610 0.610 
Inflation Bias    0.878  0.683 0.759 0.919 0.919 0.838 
   Efficiency   0.041  0.025 0.036 0.221 0.041 0.041 
   1990-1999 
Growth Bias    0.605  0.343 0.114 0.236 0.192 0.236 
   Efficiency   0.610  0.234 0.760 0.834 0.441 0.441 
Inflation Bias    0.065  0.059 0.024 0.041 0.032 0.066 
   Efficiency   0.838  0.944 0.726 0.683 0.888 0.838 
   2000-2007 
Growth Bias    0.441  0.352 0.363 0.527 0.624 0.447 
   Efficiency   0.726  0.529 0.528 0.441 0.726 0.401 
Inflation Bias    0.326  0.944 1.000 0.526 0.551 0.944 
   Efficiency   0.944  0.674 0.944 0.833 1.000 0.293 
 














Comparison with JD 
H0: JD = “Institute i” vs. 
JD better than “Institute i” 
H0: JD = “Institute i” vs. 
JD better than “Institute i”
p-value  p-value 
Growth  Institute A  0.054  0.946 
  Institute B  0.036  0.964 
  Institute C  0.365  0.635 
  Institute D  0.044  0.956 
   Institute E  0.061  0.939 
Inflation  Institute A  0.443  0.557 
  Institute B  0.119  0.881 
  Institute C  0.119  0.881 
  Institute D  0.630  0.370 
   Institute E  0.275  0.725 
 
Authors’ computations. Sources: Table 1.  
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Table 4 : Results of the Friedman test, 1970 to 2007 
 
Variable criterion Full  Sample  1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-07 
Growth  Accuracy  0.74 1.39 1.55 2.51 1.51 
  Style  3.41 6.05 3.95 9.71**  5.91 
Inflation  Accuracy  0.70 2.16 2.21 4.22 3.91 
  Style  1.04 3.71 2.34 2.73 2.98 
 
 
Authors’ computations. Sources: See Table 1. ***,**,* indicate significance at 10, 5, 1 per cent level. Critical 





Table 5 : Comparison of JD with two synthetic JD’s 
1 
 
   Growth      Inflation     
   Best 2  Worst 2  JD  Best 2  Worst 2  JD 
1980-1989 1.2  1.2  1.2  1.2  1.2  1.1 
1990-1999 1.1  1.2  1  0.6  0.5  0.5 
2000-2007 1.3  1.3  1.2  0.3  0.2  0.3 
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Absolute forecast error (JD) and divergent beliefs
Remark: GDP error for 1975 not considered (outlier).
 




Table 6: Estimation results for asymmetry parameter α  
 
      Full Sample 1972-2007 
     Estimate of α (using k instruments) 
      α (k=1)  s.e.  p-value  α (k=2)  s.e.  p-value  α (k=3)  s.e.  p-value  α (k=4)  s.e.  p-value 
Growth  Institute  A 0.472 0.083 0.738 0.472 0.083 0.732 0.469 0.083 0.713 0.467 0.083 0.691 
  Institute  B  0.472 0.083 0.738 0.469 0.083 0.713 0.471 0.083 0.731 0.467 0.083 0.693 
  Institute  C  0.611 0.081 0.171 0.615 0.081 0.158 0.620 0.081 0.138 0.627 0.081 0.116 
  Institute  D 0.528 0.083 0.738 0.528 0.083 0.738 0.531 0.083 0.713 0.531 0.083 0.705 
  Institute  E  0.556 0.083 0.502 0.563 0.083 0.449 0.557 0.083 0.493 0.566 0.083 0.423 
    JD  0.528 0.083 0.738 0.530 0.083 0.717 0.529 0.083 0.730 0.532 0.083 0.701 
Inflation Institute  A 0.556 0.083 0.502 0.588 0.082 0.282 0.556 0.083 0.500 0.591 0.082 0.265 
  Institute  B  0.583 0.082 0.310 0.619 0.081 0.143 0.583 0.082 0.310 0.625 0.081 0.121 
  Institute  C  0.611 0.081 0.171 0.630 0.080 0.105 0.624 0.081 0.126 0.639 0.080 0.083 
  Institute  D 0.556 0.083 0.502 0.573 0.082 0.377 0.556 0.083 0.500 0.573 0.082 0.375 
  Institute  E  0.583 0.082 0.310 0.611 0.081 0.173 0.584 0.082 0.308 0.612 0.081 0.170 
  JD  0.611 0.081 0.171 0.643 0.080 0.073 0.611 0.081 0.171 0.650 0.079 0.058  
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Table 6: cont’d 
 
 
      Sample: 1972-1989 
     Estimate of α (using k instruments) 
      α (k=1)  s.e.  p-value  α (k=2)  s.e.  p-value  α (k=3)  s.e.  p-value  α (k=4)  s.e.  p-value 
Growth  Institute  A 0.444 0.117 0.635 0.442 0.117 0.620 0.440 0.117 0.609 0.435 0.117 0.576 
  Institute  B  0.389 0.115 0.334 0.383 0.115 0.308 0.378 0.114 0.286 0.367 0.114 0.242 
  Institute  C  0.500 0.118 1.000 0.500 0.118 1.000 0.500 0.118 1.000 0.500 0.118 1.000 
  Institute  D 0.389 0.115 0.334 0.388 0.115 0.331 0.353 0.113 0.192 0.327 0.111 0.118 
  Institute  E  0.500 0.118 1.000 0.500 0.118 1.000 0.500 0.118 1.000 0.500 0.118 1.000 
    JD  0.444 0.117 0.635 0.440 0.117 0.606 0.441 0.117 0.617 0.435 0.117 0.579 
Inflation Institute  A 0.500 0.118 1.000 0.500 0.118 1.000 0.500 0.118 1.000 0.500 0.118 1.000 
  Institute  B  0.556 0.117 0.635 0.652 0.112 0.176 0.557 0.117 0.625 0.688 0.109 0.085 
  Institute  C  0.500 0.118 1.000 0.500 0.118 1.000 0.500 0.118 1.000 0.500 0.118 1.000 
  Institute  D 0.500 0.118 1.000 0.500 0.118 1.000 0.500 0.118 1.000 0.500 0.118 1.000 
  Institute  E  0.556 0.117 0.635 0.633 0.114 0.242 0.556 0.117 0.631 0.665 0.111 0.137 
  JD  0.556 0.117 0.635 0.618 0.115 0.301 0.556 0.117 0.635 0.642 0.113 0.209  
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      Sample: 1990-2007 
     Estimate of α (using k instruments) 
      α (k=1)  s.e.  p-value  α (k=2)  s.e.  p-value  α (k=3)  s.e.  p-value  α (k=4)  s.e.  p-value 
Growth  Institute  A  0.500 0.118 1.000 0.500 0.118 1.000 0.500 0.118 1.000 0.500 0.118 1.000 
  Institute  B  0.556 0.117 0.635 0.571 0.117 0.544 0.557 0.117 0.629 0.573 0.117 0.534 
  Institute  C  0.722 0.106 0.035 0.743 0.103 0.019 0.723 0.105 0.034 0.745 0.103 0.017 
  Institute  D  0.667 0.111 0.134 0.667 0.111 0.134 0.679 0.110 0.104 0.679 0.110 0.103 
  Institute  E  0.611 0.115 0.334 0.625 0.114 0.273 0.621 0.114 0.291 0.638 0.113 0.224 
    JD  0.611 0.115 0.334 0.626 0.114 0.271 0.624 0.114 0.276 0.637 0.113 0.228 
Inflation Institute  A  0.611 0.115 0.334 0.617 0.115 0.308 0.637 0.113 0.226 0.637 0.113 0.226 
  Institute  B  0.611 0.115 0.334 0.611 0.115 0.333 0.611 0.115 0.333 0.611 0.115 0.333 
  Institute  C  0.722 0.106 0.035 0.722 0.106 0.035 0.726 0.105 0.031 0.727 0.105 0.031 
  Institute  D  0.611 0.115 0.334 0.622 0.114 0.286 0.612 0.115 0.332 0.624 0.114 0.279 
  Institute  E  0.611 0.115 0.334 0.613 0.115 0.326 0.616 0.115 0.311 0.617 0.115 0.309 
    JD  0.667 0.111 0.134 0.670 0.111 0.124 0.678 0.110 0.107 0.684 0.110 0.093 
 
 
Authors’ computations. Sources: See Table 1.   
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Figure 2: Implied loss functions for GDP/ GNP growth forecasts (1972-2007, 1972-1989, 1990-2007) 
Panel (a): Full Sample 
 
Panel (b): 1972 – 1989 
 
Panel (c): 1990 – 2007 
 
 
Authors’ computations. Sources: See Table 1.  
 
Figure 3: Implied loss functions inflation forecasts (1972-2007, 1972-1989, 1990-2007) 
Panel (a): Full Sample 
 
Panel (b): 1972 – 1989 
 
Panel (c): 1990 – 2007 
 
 
Authors’ computations. Sources: See Table 1.  
  
Figure 4: Forecast encompassing weights (sum scaled to 100 








Panel (b) Inflation forecasts 
 







Table A 1a: Range of autumn growth forecasts, median JD outcome and actuals, 1970 to 
2007 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 






(7) - (6) 
1970 3.50 4.20 3.80    4.90 1.10     
1971 3.50 4.40 3.82 4.20 2.80 1.02 1.40 0.38 
1972 0.70 3.10 1.38 1.30 2.90 1.52 1.60 0.08 
1973 4.30 5.60 5.08 4.70 5.30 0.22 0.60 0.38 
1974 2.10 3.90 3.42 2.90 0.40 3.02 2.50 -0.52 
1975 2.20 2.60 2.42 2.30 -3.40 5.82 5.70 -0.12 
1976 3.00 4.50 3.98 3.80 5.60 1.62 1.80 0.18 
1977 3.90 6.10 5.28 5.40 2.40 2.88 3.00 0.12 
1978 2.20 3.60 2.98 2.80 3.40 0.42 0.60 0.18 
1979 2.90 4.30 3.60 3.80 4.40 0.80 0.60 -0.20 
1980 1.60 2.70 2.30 2.40 1.80 0.50 0.60 0.10 
1981 -0.90 0.60 -0.08 0.10 -0.30 0.22 0.40 0.18 
1982 -1.10 1.30 0.56 0.80 -1.10 1.66 1.90 0.24 
1983  -0.90 0.30 0.00 0.00 1.30 1.30 1.30 0.00 
1984 1.60 2.50 1.94 2.10 2.60 0.66 0.50 -0.16 
1985 1.50 2.30 1.90 2.00 2.40 0.50 0.40 -0.10 
1986 2.70 3.20 2.86 2.80 2.40 0.46 0.40 -0.06 
1987 2.40 3.50 2.88 2.80 1.70 1.18 1.10 -0.08 
1988 1.70 2.30 2.02 1.90 3.40 1.38 1.50 0.12 
1989 1.70 1.90 1.80 1.90 4.00 2.20 2.10 -0.10 
1990 2.70 3.40 3.04 3.00 2.60 0.44 0.40 -0.04 
1991 2.50 2.90 2.72 2.60 3.10 0.38 0.50 0.12 
1992 1.50 1.90 1.70 1.80 1.50 0.20 0.30 0.10 
1993 0.10 1.40 0.84 0.40 -1.90 2.74 2.30 -0.44 
1994  -0.70 1.10 0.54 0.80 2.30 1.76 1.50 -0.26 
1995 1.10 2.70 2.22 2.50 1.60 0.62 0.90 0.28 
1996 1.90 2.70 2.34 2.40 1.40 0.94 1.00 0.06 
1997 1.70 2.40 2.16 2.40 2.20 0.04 0.20 0.16 
1998 2.30 3.10 2.80 2.80 2.80 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1999 2.00 2.90 2.42 2.30 1.50 0.92 0.80 -0.12 
2000 2.40 2.60 2.52 2.70 3.00 0.48 0.30 -0.18 
2001 2.50 3.00 2.70 2.70 0.60 2.10 2.10 0.00 
2002 1.50 1.90 1.64 1.30 0.20 1.44 1.10 -0.34 
2003 1.30 1.90 1.64 1.40 -0.10 1.74 1.50 -0.24 
2004 1.50 1.80 1.68 1.70 1.70 0.02 0.00 -0.02 
2005 1.10 1.70 1.44 1.50 0.90 0.54 0.60 0.06 
2006 1.00 1.40 1.20 1.20 2.50 1.30 1.30 0.00 
2007 1.00 1.70 1.38 1.40 2.50 1.12 1.10 -0.02 
 
Authors’ computations. Sources: See Table 1.  
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Table A 1b: Range of autumn inflation forecasts, median JD outcome and actuals, 1970 to 2007 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 






(7) - (6) 
1970 2.30 3.30 2.95 2.70 3.80 0.85 1.10 0.25 
1971 3.30 3.80 3.56 3.60 5.30 1.74 1.70 -0.04 
1972 3.50 4.70 4.20 4.40 5.80 1.60 1.40 -0.20 
1973 4.90 6.00 5.40 5.50 7.10 1.70 1.60 -0.10 
1974 4.40 6.50 5.78 5.80 7.30 1.52 1.50 -0.02 
1975 6.00 7.10 6.60 6.50 6.10 0.50 0.40 -0.10 
1976 3.50 5.00 4.62 5.50 4.50 0.12 1.00 0.88 
1977 4.20 4.60 4.36 4.30 2.90 1.46 1.40 -0.06 
1978 3.80 4.20 3.98 4.00 2.60 1.38 1.40 0.02 
1979 3.00 3.90 3.40 3.40 4.20 0.80 0.80 0.00 
1980 4.20 4.50 4.32 4.30 5.40 1.08 1.10 0.02 
1981 3.70 4.00 3.80 3.80 5.90 2.10 2.10 0.00 
1982 4.20 5.00 4.58 4.60 5.20 0.62 0.60 -0.02 
1983 3.40 4.10 3.76 3.70 3.00 0.76 0.70 -0.06 
1984 2.70 3.20 3.02 3.00 2.60 0.42 0.40 -0.02 
1985 1.70 2.50 2.24 2.20 2.00 0.24 0.20 -0.04 
1986 1.70 2.20 1.98 2.10 -0.40 2.38 2.50 0.12 
1987 1.50 1.80 1.60 1.50 0.60 1.00 0.90 -0.10 
1988 1.60 2.50 1.94 1.90 1.30 0.64 0.60 -0.04 
1989 2.30 2.90 2.54 2.60 3.10 0.56 0.50 -0.06 
1990 2.80 3.30 3.04 3.00 2.50 0.54 0.50 -0.04 
1991 3.70 4.40 3.96 3.90 3.60 0.36 0.30 -0.06 
1992 3.80 4.10 3.98 4.00 4.10 0.12 0.10 -0.02 
1993 3.20 4.10 3.54 3.70 3.40 0.14 0.30 0.16 
1994 2.90 3.20 3.00 3.00 2.60 0.40 0.40 0.00 
1995 2.10 2.50 2.24 2.30 1.90 0.34 0.40 0.06 
1996 2.10 2.40 2.24 2.20 1.90 0.34 0.30 -0.04 
1997 1.30 1.70 1.54 1.50 1.90 0.36 0.40 0.04 
1998 1.90 2.10 2.02 2.00 0.90 1.12 1.10 -0.02 
1999 1.00 1.30 1.22 1.20 0.80 0.42 0.40 -0.02 
2000 1.00 1.70 1.42 1.30 1.40 0.02 0.10 0.08 
2001 1.30 1.90 1.64 1.60 1.80 0.16 0.20 0.04 
2002 1.20 1.70 1.44 1.30 1.40 0.04 0.10 0.06 
2003 1.10 1.50 1.34 1.60 1.00 0.34 0.60 0.26 
2004 1.00 1.30 1.16 1.20 1.50 0.34 0.30 -0.04 
2005 0.20 1.30 0.92 1.50 1.40 0.48 0.10 -0.38 
2006 1.50 1.80 1.68 1.70 1.40 0.28 0.30 0.02 
2007 2.10 2.40 2.24 2.30 2.20 0.04 0.10 0.06 
Authors’ computations. Sources: See Table 1. 
 




















































Authors’ computations. Sources: See Table 1. 
 